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Supreme Court No. 12361 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs sought and obtained a judgment against De-
fendants wherein the court determined that the defendants 
were estopped from withholding approval of plaintiffs' pro-
posed residential subdivision plan and found, as a matter of 
law, that plaintiffs had a vested right to proceed with 
their proposed residential subdivision. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The parties filed a Statement of Stipulated Facts and a 
Statement of Stipulated Issues with the district court. 
Thereafter, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment requesting 
the district court to declare that plaintiffs had a vested 
right to develop a subdivision consisting of single-family 
dwelling units and to further declare that defendants were 
estopped from prohibiting plaintiffs' development of their 
property. 
The district court ordered plaintiffs' subdivision to 
be approved on the grounds that the defendants were estopped 
from refusing to approve the subdivision and that plaintiffs 
had a vested right to develop the subdivision subject only 
to plaintiffs' cowpliance with the reasonable requirements 
of the Logan City Ordinances. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-respondents seek to affirm the lower court's 
order which estopped defendants from disapproving plaintiffs' 
proposed residential subdivision and granted plaintiffs a 
vested right to develop the proposed residential subdivision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In February, 1969, plaintiffs purchased 18.53 acres of 
land located within the boundaries of the City of Logan 
between Third and Sixth North and Sixth and Eighth West with 
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the intent to develop the property for uses including the 
development of single-family dwelling units for families 
seeking residential housing in a moderate price range. In 
connection with the purchase and development of said property, 
the plaintiffs expended s~bstantial time and effort in 
conducting marketing studies in order to determine the 
highest, and best use for the property. The plaintiffs 
determined that there was a need for moderate-priced housing 
in the City of Logan and that this would be the highest and 
best use in connection with the development of the property. 
Lev~ande Reeder, one of the plaintiffs, and principal 
owner and President of plaintiff, Western Land Equities, 
Inc., had several conversations with members of the Logan 
City Municipal Council and the City Planner, Mark Brenchley, 
regarding the development of the property. Reeder informed 
those officials of his intent to develop the property for 
single-family dwelling residential uses and was encouraged 
by the City Planner and members of the Municipal Council to 
develop the property for such a use. 
Prior to April, 1976, the area in which plaintiffs were 
to develop their property permitted the development of 
single-fan,ily dwelling homes. In April, 1976, the City of 
Logan adopted a land-use ordinance (Logan City Ordinances, 
§17-l-l, et ~) under which the plaintiffs' above-described 
-3-
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property was designated in an M-1 zone, known as a light in-
dustry district. Among the permitted uses of property 
within the M-1 district, until January 31, 1978, was "dwelling, 
one family detached" which term is used by the City of Logan 
to designate subdivisions consisting of single-family residential 
units. 
The City of Logan has also adopted an ordinance entitled 
Subdivision Rules and Recommendations, Logan City Ordinances, 
§17-22-1, et ~· which sets forth the procedures whereby 
single-family residential subdivisions are to be approved by 
the City of Logan. That procedure is as follows: 
1. Consultation with the Logan City 
Planning Commission; 
2. Preparation and submittal of three 
copies of a preliminary plan of the 
subdivision with the Logan City Plan-
ning Commission. The Plan is to comply 
with the minimum requirements set forth 
in the subdivision ordinance; 
3. The applicant is to obtain the Logan 
City Planning Commission's approval of 
a preliminary plan. If the preliminary 
plan is disapproved, reasons for dis-
approval shall be transmitted to the 
applicant. 
4. If the Planning Commission approves the 
preliminary plan, the applicant is to 
prepare final plans and specifications 
including the minimum improvements 
required by Section 17-22-7 and submit 
the plans and specifications to the Logan 
City Planning Commission for final approval. 
-4-
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5. The final plan is either approved or dis-
approved by the Logan City Planning Commission. 
Pursuant to the 1976 Ordinance requirements, in March, 
1977, plaintiffs undertook to comply with the Logan City 
Subdivision Ordinance and to do whatever was necessary for 
the development of single-family dwelling units upon the 
property in question. During that same month, plaintiffs 
consulted with Hike Lund of Hountain Hest Design and con-
tracted with him to prepare a preliminary subdivision plan 
and present the plan to the Logan City Planning Commission 
and the Logan City Hunicipal Council for their approval. 
Thereafter, plaintiff, LeGrande Reeder, and his engineer, 
Hike Lund, consulted with the Logan City Engineering and 
Planning Department regarding the proposed subdivision and 
informed the officials of each department of plaintiffs' 
intention to develop the property in question. After these 
consultations, plaintiffs directed their engineer to prepare 
a preliminary plan consisting of an 89-lot subdivision to be 
known as the Hillow Creek Subdivision. This plan was prepared 
by plaintiffs' engineer, Hike Lund, and submitted to the 
Logan City Planning Co~~ission on July 18, 1977. The pre-
liminary plan was unanimously accepted and placed on the 
agenda for a second reading before the Planning Commission. 
On August 10, 1977, Hike Lund appeared before the Logan 
City Planning Commission for the second reading and approval 
of the Willow Creek Subdivision Preliminary Plan. 
-5-
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Consideration of the Preliminary Plan was tabled and plaintiffs 
were asked to approach the Logan City Municipal Council to 
consider the question of whether residential housing should 
be permitted in a district designated "M-1." 
On August 18, 1977, plaintiffs' engineer presented the 
Willow Creek Subdivision Preliminary Plan to the Logan City 
Municipal Council for approval. The Council referred the 
matter back to the Logan City Planning Commission with the 
recommendation that protective covenants be written and that 
more roadways into and out of the subdivision be investigated. 
Plaintiffs' engineer again appeared before the Logan City 
Planning Commission on September 14, 1977, at which time 
the Commission tabled the matter for a period of 60 days. 
On October 12, 1977. the Logan City Planning Commission, 
again met and at this meeting, the Planning Commission, 
for the first time, went on record as opposing subdivisions 
in "M-1" zones. 
On November 9, 1977, the Logan City Planning Commission 
rejected plaintiffs' proposed Hillow Creek Subdivision, 
stating the following grounds: 
1. The Hillow Creek Subdivision was against the 
the "intent" of the Logan City Land Use 
Ordinance and the master plan; and 
2. The Willow Creek Subdivision Plan provided 
for only one ingress and egress, and 
-6-
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3. The Willow Cr2ek Subdivision Plan was sur-
rounded by railroads on three sides. 
The foregoing are the only reasons which the Logan City 
Planning Commission cited to plaintiffs in connection wi.th 
their rejection of plaintiffs' subdivision. 
The plaintiffs appealed the decision of the Logan City 
Planning Con~ission to the Logan City Municipal Council. 
Plaintiffs' appeal was rejected at a meeting of the council 
on November 17, 1977. 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the First Judicial 
District Court of Cache County, State of Utah, on December 
23, 1977. Thereafter, on January 31, 1978, Logan City 
amended its land-use ordinance so as to specifically re-
strict the development of single-family dwelling units in an 
"M-1" district except by special permit. The parties submitted 
a stipulated statement of facts and a stipulated statement 
of issues to the court in connection with plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment requesting the court to determine, as a 
matter of law, that plaintiffs had a vested right to develop 
their subdivision consisting of single-family dwelling homes 
and that defendants, as a matter of law, were estopped from 
denying app~oval of plaintiffs' subdivision. The stipulated 
statement of issues submitted to the court are set forth 
below as follows: 
-7-
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Counsel for the parties submit the 
following stipulated issues of law 
for the court's determination: 
1. Did the M-1 land-use description 
as set forth in the Logan City Land-
Use Ordinance of 1976, prior to the 
January 31, 1978 amendment, permit 
the development of subdivisions con-
sisting of single-family dwelling units 
on property zoned M-l? 
2. Does the amendment to the M-1 
land-use description of the Logan City 
Land-Use Ordinance of 1976, which was 
adopted January 31, 1978 and which pro-
hibits the development of single-family 
units in the M-1 zone except by special 
use permit, give defendants the authority 
to deny approval of plaintiffs' Willow 
Creek Subdivision which was submitted prior 
to the amendment and appears to be proper 
in all other respects other than those 
items set forth in paragraph 9 of the 
stipulated statement of facts? 
Paragraph 9 of the stipulated statement of facts sub-
mitted to the court is set forth as follows: 
~t has not been contended by defendants 
that this preliminary plan did not comply 
in all articulars v1ith the minimum re-
qu~rements o t e Logan City Su division 
Ordinance with the exception that Logan 
City has raised questions concerning in-
gress and egress in and out of the sub-
division, the fact that the subdivision 
is surrounded on three sides by railroad 
tracks and the need to establish protec-
tive covenants restraining manufacturing 
uses within the subdivision. It is not 
intended by the parties that the provisions 
herein shall be binding upon them with 
respect to the subdivision's compliance 
with minimum requirements. (Emphasis 
added). 
-8-
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Both of the Stipulated Issues of Law submitted by 
the parties to the district court for its determination 
involve the doctrines of vested rights and equitable es-
toppel. The appellants have raised other issues in their 
brief relating to alleged technical items of non··compliance 
with the zoning ordinance by the plaintiffs, such as the 
lack of a vlalbvay. However, the clistri ct: court found, as 
a matter of fact, that the plaintiffs had complied with or 
indicated that they would comply with each reasonable re-
quirement established by the defendants. The court also 
found, as a matter of fact, that the City Planner and 
municipal co1..mcil members encouraged the development. As 
clearly evidenced by the defendants' action in going on 
record opposing subdivisions in the M-1 zone and in so 
amending the ordinance, the only real objection to plain-
tiffs' proposed subdivision was that the defendants decided 
that they did not want a residential subdivision in the M-1 
zone, even though the use was permitted under the zoning 
ordinance. This was the issue first submitted to the 
court below by stipulation of the parties. The second 
issue goes to whether a local zoning authority may, with 
retroactive application, amend or change its zoning laws. 
These are the only issues which were before the court be-
low, and the appellants cannot at this time raise other 
issues. 
-9-
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The Court granted plaintiffs' :t-1otion for Su!TU11ary Judgment 
and in so doing, entered the following Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The M-1 land-use description as set 
forth in the Logan City Land-Use 
Ordinance of 1976 did permit the 
development of subdivisions consist-
ing of detached single-family dwelling 
units on properties zoned M-1 prior to 
January 31, 1978. 
2. Plaintiffs have substantially complied 
with the procedural requirements of the 
Logan City Ordinance, §17-22-1, with re-
spect to seeking approval of their pre-
liminary subdivision plan prior to filing 
this action. 
3. Plaintiffs have a vested right to develop 
a subdivision consisting of detached 
single-family dwelling units upon the sub-
ject property in accordance with the reason-
able requirements set forth in the Logan 
City ordinances. 
4. Defendants are estopped from denying 
plaintiffs' preliminary subdivision on the 
grounds that it is situated in an M-1 use zone. 
Pursuant to the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the court entered a judgment for the plaintiffs and against 
the defendants granting plaintiffs the right to develop the sub-
division consisting of detached single-family dwelling homes 
and directed that the plaintiffs develop their subdivision in a 
manner consistent with the reasonable requirements of the Logan 
City ordinances relating to subdivision development. 
-10-
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ARGUMENT ONE 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE A VESTED RIGHT TO CONSTRUCT 
THE WILLOW CREEK SUBDIVISION 
It is a stipulated fact that the area wherein plaintiffs' 
proposed subdivision is located is zoned M-1 under Logan 
City Zoning Ordinances. It has also been stipulated that at 
the time plaintiffs made application for approval of their 
subdivision, one of the permitted uses in the M-1 district 
was, "Dwelling, one-family DET." The parties stipulated the 
term "Dwelling, one-family DET, ·· is the term by which the 
City of Logan Zoning Ordinance provides for single-family 
residential use within specified use districts. The district 
court further found that the term "dwelling, one-family 
detached,·· was the term which was used by the city of Logan 
to designate subdivisions consisting of single-family residential 
units. This finding by the court is consistent with the use 
with which the term is used throughout the 1976 Logan City 
Ordinance. There can be no question but what, as the district 
court found, single-family detached dwellings and subdivisions 
consisting of single-family residential units were permitted 
in the M-1 zone prior to the change in the zoning ordinance 
on January 3, 1978, which change was made several months 
after plaintiffs' request for approval of the Willow Creek 
Subdivision and after plaintiffs filed their action for 
declaratory and equitable relief. 
-11-
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The Utah Supreme Court has already decided the question 
whether a municipality can change its zoning ordinance to 
prohibit a proposed use for which application has been made 
prior to the change. In Contracts Funding & Mortgage 
Exchange v. Maynes, 527 P.2d 1073 (Utah 1974), the plaintiff 
had sought a conditional use permit for the construction of 
mobile homes. The Salt Lake County Planning Commission 
conditionally approved the application and afterward verbally 
denied plaintiff's application for a building permit. There-
after, a written notice of such denial was given and the 
plaintiff appealed directly to the county commission. The 
county commission denied the request and later, when the 
plaintiff again sought a building permit, the commission not 
only denied the appeal, but, two days later, passed a zoning 
ordinance which would not allow plaintiff's proposed use. 
The court stated: 
Therefore, as we see it, the plaintiff 
had a right to build what it said it 
wanted to build, if it had filed an 
application for a permit to do so. 
527 P.2d at 1074 (Emphasis is the 
court's). 
The Utah Supreme Court held that the county could not 
eliminate the plaintiffs' right to develop property in a 
manner consistent with the use available at the time that 
plaintiff submitted its application to the county. The 
court further held that the county could not eliminate a 
permissible use under such circumstances by enacting an ex 
-12-
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post facto zoning change. The court stated: 
There is nothing in the record to indicate 
that the County or anyone else, denied the 
application for a permit because of failure 
to file something, pay something, do some-
thing or violate something. The presumption 
in this case is in favor of the applicant's 
right, with incidental, but serious constitu-
tional and other problems proposed by the 
facts here as to due process, impairment of 
the obligation of contracts, scope of sovereign 
authority, etc. 
There is considerable urgence in this, 
some of "'hich appears to be gratuitous 
. suggesting an omnipotence in County 
government to disturb or destroy pre-existing 
property rights, which seems to be the nub 
of the case. 
We think the only way the County could 
have justified a reversal of the trial 
court's decision, would have been to show 
that "Contracts," after having been denied 
the opportunity (which v:as not granted 
here), had not satisfied some kind of 
procedural, governmental or other regula-
tion as a condition precedent to the 
application's grant, -which the County 
here completely has failed in its task 
to establish. 
The simple fact is, that a property 
owner, having done everything necessary 
under existing laws, cannot be expected 
to be circumscribed by ex post facto 
modus operandi leges, such as zoning 
Ordinances presuming to upside-down 
the hourglass. . .. 
The weakness of defendant's case is 
anorcfinance .~:L~iT sus-tal:necra:5 to the 
property--;uDJect of -Enl:STitlgatlon, 
wourcr-uestroy property rlgr.ts ancr-
cmiisculatc an-oeT:LrDTi-13--u:-Iavls and 
ref0::iT<iflo!13 extanCattEctirne applica-
tlon J or J. pennl t lv3S made, Dy retro-
S?CCL~-.:-ancfeTicctlve by such ex post 
facto clet(•rmination, as of a date nearly a 
year before. If this be permissible there is 
-13-
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no reason why the ordinance could 
not reach back five years, a decade or 
earlier. 527 P. 2d at 1074. (Emphasis added). 
The plaintiffs purchased the property and intended to 
develop the property for uses including the development of 
single-family dwelling units. Plaintiff, LeGrande Reeder, 
had several conversations with the City Planner and members 
of the Logan City Municipal Council in which he informed 
them of his intent to so develop the property and was encouragec 
by them to proceed with that development. The district court 
found that plaintiffs undertook to comply with the Logan City 
Subdivision Ordinance and made an effort to do whatever was 
necessary for the development of single-family dwelling 
units upon their property. (Finding No. 9) 
Plaintiffs prepared a preliminary subdivision plan and 
presented it to the Logan City Planning Commission on July 
18, 1977, where the plan was unanimously accepted. (Finding 
No. 12). 
On August 10, 1977, plaintiffs' engineer appeared before 
the Logan City Planning Commission for a second reading concern· 
ing the approval of the subdivision and the planning commission 
voted to table the matter until the municipal council could 
consider the question whether residential housing would be 
permitted in a district designated as "M-1." (Finding No. 13). 
On August 18, 1978, plaintiffs presented the preliminary 
plan to the Logan City Municipal Council for approval and 
the city commission referred the matter back to the planning 
-14-
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commission Hith recommendations for protective covenants and 
more roadways concerning ingress and egress through the 
subdivision. (Finding No. 14) . 
On September 14, 1977 plaintiffs again appeared before 
the Logan City Planning Connnission but the commission tabled 
a decision to approve or disapprove of the subdivision for a 
matter of 60 days. (Finding No. 15). 
On October 12, 1977, the Logan City Planning Connnission 
again met and decided to go on record as opposing the development 
of subdivisions in areas designated "M-1." 
On November 9, 1977, the Logan City Planning Connnission re-
jected plaintiffs' proposed subdivision and plaintiffs appealed 
the decision of the Logan City Planning Commission to the Logan 
City Municipal Council. Plaintiffs' appeal was rejected at a meet-
ing of the Logan City Municipal Council held on November 17, 1977. 
(Findings 17 and 18). 
On the 31st day of January, 1978, after plaintiffs had 
commenced an action in the district court seeking declaratory 
relief that plaintiffs had a vested right to develop their sub-
division as proposed and that defendants were estopped from denying 
the development of the plaintiffs' subdivision as proposed, the 
Logan City Municipal Council amended the Logan City Land Use 
Ordinances to restrict single-family dwelling units located in 
"M-1" districts except by special use permit only. (Finding No.l9). 
The court further found that the Logan City Planning 
Commission refused to approve plaintiffs' subdivision plan 
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although the plaintiffs had complied and had indicated that 
they would comply with all reasonable requirements established 
by the local governing authorities with respect to the 
application for and development of their subdivision (Finding 
No. 21). 
Nowhere did Logan City allege or attempt to prove that 
the plaintiffs failed to satisfy some procedure, or 
regulation which was a condition precedent to granting approval 
as required by Contracts Funding. The simple fact is that plain-
tiffs in the instant case did not fail to file something, 
pay something, do something or violate something. Under 
Contracts Funding, where, as here, a property owner such as 
the plaintiffs have done everything necessary under existing 
laws (1976 Logan City Ordinance), they "cannot be expected 
to be circumscribed by ex post facto modus operandi leges, 
such zoning ordinances presuming to be upside-down the 
hourglass." 
Based upon the foregoing circumstances and findings the 
court concluded, as a matter of law, that "plaintiffs have a 
vested right to develop a subdivision consisting of detached 
single-family dwelling units upon the subject property." 
Plaintiffs urge the court to affirm the rule established 
in Contracts Funding that once proper application has been made 
for a use permitted under then-existing zoning ordinances, the 
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rights of the applicant vest and the zoning authority can-
not then change or prevent the use allowed at the time 
application was made. Such a principle of law is not only 
just, but is also demanded for sound, public policy reasons. 
If municipal councils and the various local governments 
throughout the state of Utah are allowed to amend their 
ordinances with retroactive application, such a precedent 
would serve to discourage development, and further dis-
courage the financial backing v1hich is necessary for such 
development. If local governmental entities were able to 
so change the zoning laT.vs, lending i.:1stitutions would 
certainly be more hesitant to commit substantial funds to 
building projects and their developers. Doubtless, 
these same institutions would require higher interest 
rates and higher security for any loans they might make 
for such developments. Such is not the law and plaintiffs-
respondents urge the court to, at this time, affirm those 
principles laid down in Contracts Funding, supra. 
ARGUMENT TWO 
DEFENDANTS ARE EOUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM 
DENYING APPROVAL 'oF PLAINTIFFS' SUB-
DIVISION PLAN 
In Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 692 (Utah 
1976) the Supreme Court articulated the requirements of 
equitable estoppel: 
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Estoppel arises when a party . . by h:i s 
acts, representations, or admissions, or by 
his silence when he ought to speak, in-
tentionally or through culpable negligence, 
induces another .. to believe certain facts 
to exist and that such other . . acting 
with reasonable prudence and diligence, re-
lies and acts thereon so that he will suffer 
an injustic8 if the former . . is permitted 
to deny the existence of such facts. 549 P.2d 
at 697. 
The Court further noted that the "doctrine of equitable 
estoppel does not operate in favor of one who has knowledge 
of the eseential facts or who has convenient and available 
means of obtaining such knowledge", 549 P.2d at 697 4, nor is 
it applicable if the party seeking the protection of equity 
"exercised neither prudence nor diligence." 
In Dansie v. ~h~::-ca.·· C:.t:y, 560 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1977), 
the court recognizee that the doctrine of estoppel applied 
to zoning situations. However, the court held that estoppel 
was inapplicable under the fact situation of that case. One 
of the reasons given in Dansie that the estoppel doctrine 
did not apply was that the city employee who gave out information 
which led the petitioner to believe that he could erect a 
structure in violation of the zoning laws had "no authority 
whatever" to give out that information. 
In Morgan, the court laid out the applicable test for 
the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 
Under Morgan, there are four essential elements which must 
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he found before the doctrine will apply. These are: 
(1) A~ts, representations or omissions, or 
Sllence when one ought to speak which, 
(2) ~ntcntionally or through culpable negligence 
lnduce another to believe certain facts 
to exist; 
(3) The parties so induced to believe must 
with reasonable prudence and diligence 
rely upon an ace thereon such that 
(4) They will suffer an injustice if the 
person who made the representations 
is permitted to deny the existence of 
such f:J.cts. 
In the instant case, there were several acts and repre-
sentations, as well as omissions, made by defendants to 
plaintiffs v:hich would have led a reasonable person to 
believe that the approval of plaintiffs' subdivision would 
be given. 
The court below found that plaintiff, LeGrande Reeder, 
had several conversations with members of the Logan City 
Municipal Council and the City Planner informing them of 
his intention to develop a subdivision consisting of single-
family dwelling homes. Plaintiff Reeder was encouraged by 
those officials to develop the property for such purpose. 
Plaintiff Reeder, from the date of his purchase of the 
property in February of 1969 until August of 1977, was never 
informed hy any city official that a subdivision consisting 
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of single-family dwelling units situated upon the subject 
property would be prohibited so long as plaintiffs complied 
with the reasonable requirements of the Logan City Ordinances. 
(Findings 7 and 8). The plaintiffs did what was necessary to 
apply for and develop the subdivision in a manner consistent 
with the Logan City Subdivision Ordinances (Findings No. 9 
and 21). 
The actions of the Logan City officials constituted 
acts, representations, admissions, and silence when they 
should have spoken, all of which would have led a reasonable 
person to believe that approval of the subdivision would 
be given upon compliance v7ith the requirements of the subdivision 
ordinance. 
The defendants' statements and actions of encouragement 
to plaintiffs referred to above and found to exist by the 
court were either made intentionally through a belief that 
such a subdivision did not violate the ordinance, or, the Logan 
City officials misled or were "culpably negligent" in not having 
understood the ordinance which they enacted and administered. 
The plaintiffs' reliance upon their statements, as the only 
authorized people to give such statements, certainly was 
reasonable and prudent. 
Having received such encouragement from the Logan City 
officials, the plaintiffs, in t1arch of 1977, undertook to 
comply with the Logan City Subdivision Ordinance and made an 
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effort to do whatever was necessary for the deveopment of 
sjngle-family dwelling units upon the property. The plaintiffs 
consulted with Mountain West Design and in particular, Mike 
Luncl, who prepared the preliminary subdivision plat and 
presented the plat ro the Logan City Planning Commission and 
the Logan City !1unicipal Council for their approval. Not 
only were there expenses involved in this as well as surveys 
made for the property, but the fact that the property was 
not utilized for some other purpose during this period of 
time because of the representations made by the Logan City 
officials and relied upon by the plaintiffs creates a large 
amount of damage suffered by plaintiffs. Because of the 
city's actions, and the litigation which has followed, for 
two years now, approval has been sought for the Willow Creek 
Subdivision Preliminary Plan. Certain out-of-pocket expenses 
incurred by the plaintiffs are detailed in the defendants' 
brief. However, the plaintiffs have also lost time, payments 
on the property, tax monies paid, and other items of expense 
which necessarily accrue to the owner of vacant property. 
The cumulative effect of these circumstances is that the 
plaintiffs •<Jill suffer a great injustice if the city is 
permitted to deny that plaintiffs' Willow Creek Subdivision 
Preliminary Plan conforms with the Logan City Subdivision 
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and Zoning Ordinances. There was never any allegation by de-
fendants or finding by the district court that plaintiffs 
had any convenient or available means for obtaining the 
knowledge that their subdivision would not or could not be 
allowed under the subdivision ordinance. By its terms, the 
ordinance allowed for single-family dwelling units and this same 
term was used by the city to designate those areas in which 
single-family residential subdivisions would be allowed. 
This difficulty is further compounded in the face of the 
defendants' silence as to any problems and the defendants' en-
couraging statements which were made by the City Planner and 
members of the Municipal Council regarding the plaintiffs' 
subdivision plans< o~ at least three occasions, pl&intiffs' en-
gineer conversed ~i:h :~e City Planner concerning the subdivision 
requirements for the preliminary plat which was being prepared 
by plaintiffs' engineer, and no mention was made or indication 
given that the Planning Commission would refuse to allow a 
subdivision of single-family dwelling units to be constructed 
upon the plaintiffs' property. 
These actions by the Logan City officials constituted 
actions, statements, and silence when actions and statements 
should have been made, which were either intentionally or 
negligently made and which reasonably induced the plaintiffs 
to rely in fact upon such representations. The situation is 
such that the plaintiffs will suffer a great injustice as 
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evidenced by the great expense of time and money caused 
by defendants' actions if defendants are permitted to 
deny approval of the subdivision. 
ARGL'11ENT THREE 
DEFENDANTS H.<WE MISREPRESENTED THE 
CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAH REGARDING 
VESTED RIGHTS AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS. 
On Page 22 of appellants' brief, appellants cite 
Dawe v. City of Scarsdale, 119 Ariz. 486, 581 P.2d 1136 
(1978) as "a typical example of the proper application of 
the universally accepted principles of vested rights and 
non-conforming uses." (Emphasis added). Respondents submit 
that there is great controversy, and no ''universally-accepted" 
methodology for handling vested rights and equitable estoppel 
issues. 
Some states, such as California, place the time of 
vesting after the builder has applied for and received a 
building permit for the specific buildings and performed 
substantial work in reliance thereof. See, Avco v. 
Southcoast Regional Commission, 535 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976). 
It would seem that the Arizona court cited by appellants 
appears to follow the California standard. 
Other slates, such as Idaho and South Carolina allow 
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rights to vest at the time of application for a permit. See 
Ready to Pour, Inc. v. McCoy, 95 Idaho 510, 511 P.2d 792 (1973); 
Pure Oil Division v. City of Columbia, 173 S.E.2d, 145 (S.C. 1970) 
The South Carolina court stated: 
We see no sound reason to protect vested 
rights acquired after a permit is issued, 
and to deny such protection to similar 
rights acquired under an ordinance as it 
existed at the time a proper application 
for a permit is made. In both instances, 
the right protected is the same, that is, 
the good faith reliance by the owner of the 
right to use his property as permitted under 
the Zoning Ordinance in force at the time of 
the application for a permit. 173 S.E.2d at 
143. 
The court went on to state that the issuance of the required 
permit 
could no~ ~e legally denied, even under a sub-
sequentiy-c~acted ordinance prohibiting such 
use, su as to deprive the owner of the 
vested rights acquired. 
[V]ested rights acquired under a zoning 
ordinance in effect at the time of the 
application for a permit will be protected 
even against a change in the zoning ordinance, 
and controls our decision here on that issue. 
Id. 
Other states, such as v]ashington, place the time of vest-
ing at either the time the permit is applied for, or sought 
and validly issued. There is some controversy on this point 
in the Washington appellate courts at this time. See Nayer~ 
v. Town of Steilacoom, 17 Hash. App. 558, 564 P.2d 1170 (\<lash. 
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App. 1977); Ulloch v. City of Bremerton, 17 Wash.App. 573, 
565 P.2d 1179 (Wash. App. 1977). 
Oregon, on the other hand, does not follow any of the 
general rules stated above. In Clackamas Co. v. Holm~_£, 265 
Ore. 193, J08 P.2d 190 (1973), the Oregon Supreme Court 
stated that the determination of the time of vesting was to 
be made factually on a case-by-case basis. In order to 
acquire a vested right to proceed with construction of a 
non-conforming use after a zone change, substantial construction 
must have been started, or substantial costs incurred. The 
court should also consider the ratio of expenditures to 
total cost of the project, good faith of the landowner, 
whether the owner had notice of any proposed zoning changes 
before starting his improvements, the kind of project, the 
location and ultimate cost of the project, and whether the 
expenditures could be used for any allowed use. The court 
rejected any set formula for determining the time when 
rights vest and particularly rejected the theory that rights 
vest only after receiving a building permit. 
Hawaii has recently held the opposite of the California 
theory of vested rights urged upon the court by the de-
fendants. In Allen v. City and County of Honolulu, 571 
P.2d 328 (llawaii 1977) the Hawaii Supreme Court, quoting 
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from Heeter, "Zoning Estoppel; Application of the Principles 
of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes" 
71 Urban L. Ann. 63 at 64 through 65 stated: 
The defense of estoppel is derived from 
equity, but the defense of vested rights 
reflects principles of common and constitu-
tional law. Similarly their elements are 
different. Estoppel focuses on whether 
it would be inequitable to allow the 
government to repudiate its prior 
conduct; vested rights upon whether the 
owner acquired real property rights 
which cannot be taken away by governmental 
regulation. Nevertheless, the courts 
seem to reach the same results when apply 
ing these defenses to identical factual 
situations. 571 P.2d at 329. 
The Allen court recognized the position urged upon this 
court at this time by the appellants but flatly rejected it, 
stating: 
If Dennir,6 ~the applicant - developer] ex-
pended substantial sums for the preparation 
of plans and documents in good faith reliance 
upon law prior to [the new zoning ordinance] 
and which expenditures were incurred upon 
the reasonable probability of a building 
permit being issued then Denning must be 
allowed the right to proceed. 
In order to avoid unnecessary appellate 
proceedings and for the proper guidance 
of the trial court, we are of the opinion 
that for Denning to be allowed the right 
to proceed in the constructing the 
planned structure the facts must show that 
Denning had been given assurances of some 
form by appellants that Denning's proposed 
construction met zoning requirements. [Sic] 
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And that DC>nning had a right to rely on such 
assurances thereby equitably estopping 
appellants from enforcing the terms [of 
the new ordinance]. Id. at 330. 
The Florida court addressed the issue similarly to the 
Havmii court. In Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of 
~ood, 329 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1976) the Florida Supreme 
Court held that the city was equitably estopped from rezoning 
petitioner's property: 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel 
may be invoked against a municipality 
as if it were an individual [citations 
omitted] and the city's contention 
that the doctrine is inapplicable 
where actual physical construction 
has not yet begun, is without merit. 
[Citations omitted] ... [T]he 
doctrine of equitable estoppel will 
preclude a municipality from exercising 
its zoning power where ... 
[A] property owner (1) in good 
faith (2) upon some act or 
omission of the government (3) 
has made such a substantial 
change in position or has in-
curred such extensive obliga-
tions and expenses that it would 
be highly inequitable and unjust 
to destroy the right he acquired. 
329 So. 2d at 15 through 16. 
Under the circumstances of that case, the court held 
that the city was both equitably estopped from changing the 
zoning on plaintiff's land and that the plaintiff had 
a vested propertyright under a prior building permit. The 
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court further noted that "every citizen has the right to ex-
pect that he will be dealt with fairly by his government," 
Id .. at 18, and that unfair dealing could be the basis for 
equitable estoppel. 
Colorado has a 1 s o addressed the issues brought 
forth by the doctrines of equitable estoppel and vested 
rights. The leading case in Colorado is Crawford v. 
McLaughlin, 473 P.2d 725 (Colo. 1970). After recognizing 
the applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to 
zoning situations, and recognizing that many jurisdictions 
of the United States do not regard a property owner to have 
vested rights until the owner has taken steps in reliance on 
the permit, the court noted that in this case, the land-
owner's acts "which were of a significant nature, occurred 
preliminarily to the issuance of the permit." 473 P. 2d at 731. 
These were such acts as the purchase of the land, architectural 
fees, etc. The court further stated, "the totality of the 
situation should be weighed in the equitable balance." Id. 
The court also stated: 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel bars 
a municipal corporation from enforcing 
an obligation by taking a position contrary 
to a previous representation relied on by 
defendants to their detriment. !d. 
There are many different legal standards applied by the 
highest courts of different states throughout this country 
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concerning the issue of vested rights. Some courts place 
the time of vesting after the permit has been issued and the 
developer has materially and substantially relied thereon, 
others at the time of the issuance of the permit. Other 
courts, such as Hawaii, while recognizing a doctrinal 
difference between equitable estoppel and vested rights, 
seem to adhere to the theory that a vested right is acquired 
by the property owner at the time the local governmental 
entity is estopped from enforcing the new zoning ordinance 
against the property owner. Still other courts, among 
which Utah is included, place the time of vesting at the 
time application is made by a developer to the governing 
authority. This is the principle established and set down 
in Contracts Funding. 
If the property owner has done everything necessary 
under existing laws to apply for a permitted use, the local 
governing authority cannot deny the property owner that use 
by enacting zoning ordinances eliminating the use. The 
rationale, as previously stated in the Contracts Funding 
case, is consistent with the district court's decision to 
grant plaintiffs a vested right to develop their subdivision 
and to estop defendants under Morgan, supra, from denying 
plaintiffs the right to develop their property as a residential 
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subdivision as applied for. Quoting from Contracts Funding: 
The weakness of defendants' case is . 
an ordinance, which, if sustained as to 
the property subject to this litigation, 
would destroy property rights and emasculate 
and eliminate laws and regulations extant at 
the time application for a permit was made, -
by retrospection, - and effective by such 
ex post facto determination, as of a date 
nearly a year before. If this be permissible 
there is no reason why the ordinance could 
not reach back five years, a decade or earlier. 
527 P.2d at 1074. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah law has determined that where a use is permitted 
and a property owner applies for a permit to develop its 
property for such a permitted use, that property owner's rights 
vest at the time of proper application for needed approval. 
If the property owner has satisfied the procedural requirements, 
the governing authority (in this case, Logan City) cannot 
deny the property owner the right to develop the property by 
enacting an ordinance with the effect of prohibiting a permitted 
use after the property owner has properly applied for approval. 
Under Dansie and Morgan v. State Board of Lands, supra, 
the principle was established that the local governing 
authority is estopped to deny a property owner the right to 
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pursue the development of the property owner's property 
where the local governing authority made representations or 
remained silent Hhen it ought to have spoken which induced 
the property owner to rely and the property owner reasonably 
relied on the actions or inactions of the governing authority 
to his damage and detriment. 
Plaintiffs, in 1969, purchased the subject property 
intending to develop it for uses including the development 
of single-family dwelling units for families seeking residential 
housing in a moderate price range. Plaintiffs had several 
conversations with the Logan City officials who encouraged 
plaintiffs to develop the property in such a manner. At no 
time since the purchase of the property in 1969 until August 
of 1977 were plaintiffs informed by any city official that a 
subdivision consisting of single-family dwelling units would 
not be allowed so long as the application and development 
procedures of the Logan City Ordinances were complied with. 
The plaintiffs undertook to comply and did everything necessary 
to comply with those procedures. Nevertheless, the Logan 
City officials denied plaintiffs the right to develop their 
property into a subdivision consisting of single-family 
dwelling units. 
Defendants sought to deny plaintiffs the right to 
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develop their property in such a manner by enacting an 
ordinance in January of 1978, well after plaintiff had 
applied for and made substantial efforts to comply with 
the Logan City ordinance, and well after plaintiffs had 
filed this action requesting the district court to deter-
mine whether plaintiffs had a vested right to develop their 
property and whether the defendants were estopped from 
denying the plaintiffs' right to develop their property 
in a manner which was consistent with a permitted use under 
the Logan City Zoning Ordinances. 
Plaintiffs-Respondents submit that this court should 
affirm the judgment rendered by the district court which 
held that plaintiffs have a vested right to develop 
their property as a s~t~~~ision and that defendants were 
estopped from denying plaintiffs' right to so develop 
their property. 
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